Trends in aggregate employment, hours worked per worker, and the long-run labor wedge by Epstein, Brendan et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trends in aggregate employment, hours
worked per worker, and the long-run
labor wedge
Epstein, Brendan and Mukherjee, Rahul and Finkelstein
Shapiro, Alan and Ramnath, Shanthi
March 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/99289/
MPRA Paper No. 99289, posted 30 Mar 2020 09:15 UTC
Trends in Aggregate Employment, Hours Worked
per Worker, and the Long-Run Labor Wedge
Brendan Epsteiny Alan Finkelstein Shapiroz
Rahul Mukherjeex Shanthi Ramnath{
Abstract
Hours worked are fundamentally important for aggregate economic activ-
ity, yet canonical macroeconomic models fail dramatically at tracking its long
run trends. We develop an intuitive and tractable extension of the canonical
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rm-side employment adjust-
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1 Introduction
Hours worked per population are fundamentally important for aggregate economic ac-
tivity. The contemporary canonical (dynamic, micro founded, representative agent)
macroeconomic model is broadly established as a common benchmark that can get at
the basic forces associated with the behavior of hours worked per populationwhich
we denote by Hat business cycle frequency.1. As is well known, this canonical
model can explain some, but not all, of the short-run behavior of H. Yet, the ex-
istence of such a common framework has allowed the macroeconomics literature to
succinctly identify a series of key factors that are criticalbeyond these basic forces
for successfully and with great tractability explaining the business cycle behavior of
H within the representative-agent paradigm. These factors include, among others,
search frictions and indivisible labor.2
The objective of this paper is to develop and propose a tractable benchmark model
that can serve as a common reference for modeling the trend/long-run behavior of
H. Absent such framework, it is not possible to identify the fundamental basic forces
that are relevant for answering a series of timely questions of crucial importance
and general interest. For instance, how should we expect trends in H to respond to
the following developments: a slowdown in global output, which is a critical issue
amid the ongoing convergence of the growth rate of the Chinese economy to that of
advanced economies; changes in demographics, which is a critical issue in light of the
aging of the population in advanced economies; economic policy, such as tax policy,
labor market reforms, and pension reforms, which are critical in light of fairly recent
policy developments in Europe in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and amid
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
In light of the above questions, the motivation behind our research objective is
the following. In the macroeconomics literature, in contrast to the short-run behavior
of H, an understanding of the trend behavior of H within the representative-agent
1Of course, the benchmark reference for these models is Kydland and Prescott (1982).
2Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) are key references regarding search fric-
tions, and Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) are so regarding indivisible labor.
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paradigm is considerably limited. In particular, a common, widely accepted, and
tractable benchmark model that can get at the basic forces associated with the trend
behavior of H, and, critically, that can explain to a considerable degree the trend
behavior of H, remains elusive.
Importantly, as is well known, for all purposes the canonical macroeconomic model
can explain none of the trend/long-run behavior of H. This results in the model
yielding a prominent long-run labor wedge, that is, the long-run di¤erence between
model-predicted H and empirical H.3 That said, a critical advancement in the under-
standing of the trend behavior of H in a representative-agent context took place with
Prescott (2004), who proposed taxes as an intuitive variable that could help narrow
the (long-run) labor wedge. However, Figure 1, which plots empirical H and model-
predicted H by tax-inclusive and -exclusive versions of the canonical model shows the
following. While on average taxes narrow the labor wedge in Europe substantially,
they dramatically widen the labor wedge in the United States. We refer to this as
the U.S. tax puzzle.4
Figure 1: Empirical hours worked per population and predictions from CLM model with and without
taxes for Europe (top panel) and the US (bottom panel).5
3More technically, the (long-run) labor wedge captures the extent to which, in the long run, the
marginal product of labor di¤ers from the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure.
4This result is endemic to this tax-related literature, which also includes, amont others, Ohanian
et al. (2008) and McDaniel (2011).
5Notes: All data are at yearly frequency. Total work hours are from the Conference Boards
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The model that we propose is an intuitive and tractable extension of the canonical
macroeconomic model. Our model is Walrasian and representative-agent in nature,
and nests the canonical model. Two key features distinguish our model from the
canonical one. First, the presence of employment-attainment costs on the household
side, which enter the model in the form of disutility. Second, the presence of rm-side
employment adjustment costs.
While these two modeling ingredients are not novel from the conceptual stand-
point, the technical way in which our model incorporates these ingredients is indeed
novel. Critically, the way in which our model incorporates these two ingredients re-
sults in an intuitive and straightforward disentanglement of the two margins of labor
hours worked per worker, which we denote by h, and the employment-population ra-
tio, which we denote by eon both the household and rm side. This is in contrast to
the canonical macroeconomic model, where the only endogenous labor-market vari-
able predicted by the model is H itselfwe refer to this class of model as combined
labor margin (CLM) models. As such, our models prediction of H is built from the
bottom up, with the model predicting both h and e, the product of which is of course
H. Therefore, we refer to our model as the dual labor margins (DLM) model.
Clearly, there are many ways by which the two margins of labor can be disen-
tangled. An advantage of our DLM model relative to alternative frameworks is that
household-side employment-attainment costs allow our framework to remain within
the representative-agent paradigm. Moreover, in contrast to labor search theory,
where there is involuntary unemployment, our modeling methodology is such that
any existing nonemployment is voluntary. Both of these features are critical for al-
lowing our framework to nest the canonical macroeconomic model in straightforward
fashion. Moreover, as noted below, the particular way in which our DLM model dis-
entangles the two margins of labor allows it to speak directly to the U.S. tax puzzle.
Total Economy Database, employment is from the OECD, population data are from the UN, tax
data are from McDaniel (2007), and consumption and output data are from the Penn Word Tables.
Europe refers to the simple average of European countries in our sample. Sample countries, which
are standard in related literature, and data span are limited by the availability of time series on
taxes. Details are in the papers data and theory sections.
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In addition, the way in which our DLM framework incorporates rm-side employment-
adjustment costs is such that it generates, in straightforward and intuitive fashion,
the following two relationships: a positive and contemporaneous relationship between
e and capital taxes and also between H and capital taxes, and no relationship be-
tween h and capital taxes. Importantly, we document that these relationships exist
in the dataa set of novel factswhich lends validity to our framework. Moreover,
while the empirical positive relationship between e and capital taxes is in principle
puzzling, our DLM model implies that this relationship is not causal. It is instead
an observed outcome stemming from forward-looking optimal employment demand,
and from this vantage point, in line with intuition, higher capital taxes put downward
pressure on employment demand.
In line with related literature that studies the trend behavior of H, we opera-
tionalize our model using a business cycle accounting approach.6 We show that our
model can account for the trend behavior of h (the equilibrium condition for which
is static in our model) and e (the equilibrium condition for which is a novel dynamic
expression) very well in both Europe and the United States. Therefore, our model can
account very well for the trend behavior of H across countries. As such, our model is
an important step forward in understanding the trend behavior of H relative to the
canonical macroeconomic model and, therefore, in addressing the U.S. tax puzzle.
Our work results in the following three contributions. First, our DLM model
itself. Indeed, the extent to which our DLM framework is successful in explaining
the trend behavior of h, e, and therefore H across countries suggests that our model
can justiably be proposed as a benchmark for analyzing the trend behavior of these
variables. Second, we further validate the role that taxes play as related to the trend
behavior of H as highlighted by earlier literature starting with Prescott (2004), even
though an endemic feature of this literature is the existence of the U.S. tax puzzle In
particular and for instance, while our DLM model highlights that productivity is a
major driving force associated with the trend behavior of H in the United States
6Key references are, for example, Prescott (2004) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007)
among others.
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which is something not highlighted by earlier directly-related literaturetaxes are more
important for long-run contours in the trend behavior of H. Moreover, as related to
taxes, our DLM framework also shows that a positive relationship between e and
capital taxes and H and capital taxes observed in the data (a novel stylized fact that
we document) has no causal implications. Instead, these relationships are an ex-
post outcome stemming from capital taxes putting downward pressurein line with
intuitionon forward-looking employment demand. This has not been highlighted by
earlier literature.
Third, since our DLM model does very well in explaining the trend behavior of
H in the United States, our DLM model thoroughly contributes to resolving the
U.S. tax puzzle, for which our results imply that disentangling the two margins of
labor is crucial. Of note, our DLM models equation for h, which is rigorously micro
founded, is exactly the same as the canonical models equation for H. Our DLM
results therefore imply that in terms of trends, the canonical model will give the
impression of correctly predicting trends in H if these trends are driven by h (as we
review later in the paper, this is the case empirically on average in Europe, where
as noted above the tax-inclusive canonical model is successfulin appearance). In
contrast, the canonical model will give the impression of failing to predict trends in H
if these trends are driven by trends in e (as we review later in the paper, this is the case
empirically in the United States, where as noted above the canonical model predicts
counterfactual H). Ultimately, this implies that a large fraction of the long-run labor
wedge that remains after accounting for taxes is employment itself.
Of course, it is well known that the canonical macroeconomic model faces impor-
tant limitations in accounting for the behavior of H at business cycle frequency given
an underlying lack of explanatory power over the behavior of e (hence, for instance
and as noted earlier, the relevance of labor search and indivisible labor theories).
However, that this also be the case at the trend level is surprising. Indeed, to the
extent that the macroeconomic conceptual framework for modeling the long run is
correct, then, with perfectly competitive markets and fully variable inputs, why would
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the long-run behavior of H depend notably on anything else except the long-run be-
havior of the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and the long-run
behavior of the marginal product of labor?
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3
details the data we use in our analysis. Section 4 focuses on theory and Section 5
discusses its operationalization. Section 6 presents results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our DLM framework begins as a full-edged general equilibrium labor search model.
This is so in order to thoroughly ground the key elements of our framework, which
intuition-wise trace back to search theory. As such, we build on a vast related liter-
ature, including, among others, Diamond (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
and Merz (1995). That said, our baseline DLM specication is purged of all frictions
that render the labor market noncompetitive, meaning that our baseline specication
is Walrasian: all markets are competitive. Thus, our work is also related to exist-
ing studies that consider the extensive margin of labor in such frameworks, such as
Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1987), Bils and Cho (1994), Cho and Cooley (1994), Mul-
ligan (2001), Krusell et al. (2008), Llosa et al. (2014), and Erosa (2016), among
others. Our DLM model contributes to these literatures by showing how accounting
for household employment-attainment costs and rm-side employment adjustment
costs are a means through which the extensive and intensive margins of labor can be
easily disentangled in a representative-agent Walrasian framework.7
There is a large literature on the labor wedgewhich is technically dened as the
extent to which, in equilibrium, the marginal product of labor di¤ers from the mar-
ginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure. This literature includes, among
others, Hall (2009), Shimer (2009), Pescatori and Tasci (2011), Karabarbounis (2014a
and 2014b), Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria (2014), Cociuba and Ueberfeldt
7In our DLM framework, the way in which employment adjustment costs are introduced yields
an intuitive relationship between employment and capital taxes. The broader relevance of adjust-
ment costs is emphasized in a vast literature that includes, for instance, Cooper and Willis (2004),
Caballero and Engel (2004), Cooper and Willis (2008), and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2014).
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(2015), Gourio and Rudanko (2014), and Hou and Johri (2018). Focusing on hours
worked per population, Prescott (2004) highlights that taxes are a natural candidate
to help explain the long-run labor wedge.
Regarding the long-run labor wedge and taxes, Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al.
(2008), and McDaniel (2011) are particular instances in which fairly standard tax-
inclusive versions of CLM models are used for the purposes of analysis. In all cases
CLMmodels yield counterfactual predictions for U.S. hours worked per population (to
greater or lesser degree), but successful predictions for hours worked per population
for European countries. This means that even after accounting for taxes, the long-run
U.S. labor wedge remains. Importantly, Ohanian et al. (2008) note explicitly that
the discrepancy between empirical hours worked per population in the United States
and hours predicted for the United States by CLM models are so stark that it is a
crucial question for future research in macroeconomics. Yet, in very broad terms, the
literature that studies the relationship between trends in taxes and trends in hours
worked per population ends with McDaniel (2011). This impasse in the literature is
perhaps the result of it being the case that obvious resolutions to the U.S. tax puzzle
are not evident within CLM modeling frameworks.
We contribute broadly to the labor wedge literature beyond taxes by showing
that in CLM frameworks a large portion of the long-run labor wedge stems from
deciencies in the ability of canonical models to account for the behavior of the
extensive margin of labor. As noted in the Introduction, this deciency is well known
at business cycle frequency. However, as also noted in the Introduction, it is extremely
surprising that this limitation is also present in the long run.
Importantly, our DLM model highlights that the U.S. tax puzzle can be success-
fully addressed within a Walrasian representative-agent modeling framework, that is,
within the same framework in which the U.S. tax puzzle is originally observed. This
stands in contrast with papers that highlight heterogeneity as critical for addressing
the puzzle, such as Cociuba and Ueberfeldt (2015), who stress the role of gender and
marital status. As such, our DLM model shows that heterogeneity is, in fact, not a
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critical factor for resolving the U.S. tax puzzle.
Finally, we highlight a literature that centers on the fact that, while a positive
long-run relationship between productivity and equilibrium is intuitive and empiri-
cally relevant, a denitive theory that links these two variables is lacking. See, for
instance, Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Blanchard (2007), who surveys the lit-
erature on traditional models of aggregate labor markets and concludes that in these
models there is long-run neutrality of unemployment to productivity growth, Shimer
(2010), and Elsby and Shapiro (2012). Complementing this literature our DLMmodel
suggests that a direct link between changes in total factor productivity (TFP) and
equilibrium employment can exist by TFP potentially a¤ecting job-formation costs.
Our structural estimation suggests that this is indeed the case and, moreover, that
higher TFP lower job-formation costs, which establishes a long-run positive link be-
tween TFP and employment.
3 Data
Given our focus on the trend behavior of labor market variables, in line with related
literature our analysis makes use of data at yearly frequency. The countries in our
sample are those for which, in line with related literature, there is extensive time
series data on taxes. These countries are the United States and the following eleven
european countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Our analysis spans the years
1960 - 2014, since at the time of writing this paper those are the years over which
tax data, which we need to operationalize our model, are available for these twelve
countriesin line with related literature, our main tax data are average taxes from
McDaniel (2007). These data are at yearly frequency and publicly available from the
authors website.8
Regarding the additional data we need, following related literature we use data
on consumption, output, and total factor productivity from the Penn World Tables
(Feenstra et al., 2015), which are hosted by the Groningen Growth and Development
8http://www.caramcdaniel.com/
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Center.9 Data on the working-age population (ages 15-64) come from the United
Nations10, while data on aggregate work hours and aggregate employment come from
the Conference Boards Total Economy Database.11
Of note, the McDaniel tax series are average taxes (see the Appendix for details).
For the United States, we are able to assess the sensitivity of results from using these
data by comparing them to results obtained using a series on average marginal taxes
available from the NBER.12 To the best of our knowledge, there are no comparable
tax series for the european countries in our sample. We show that results are similar
in terms of trends, but the ability of our DLMmodel to track contours of the empirical
data improves substantially. The main di¤erence between the two labor tax series
being that, as shown in Figure 3 below, the McDaniel series do not fully capture the
impact of the Reagan tax reforms (1981 through 1986).13 This has a impact on the
extent to which our DLM model can match the contour of H, but is fairly irrelevant
for our DLM models ability to match the trend behavior of H.
Table 1 presents the notation we use for empirical data through the remainder of
paper. In turn, Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the behavior of these data over our sample
period. For brevity, in the main text we present graphical results for the United States
and Europe, only, where Europe refers to the simple average of the eleven european
9These data are available for download at https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/. Regard-
ing TFP, these data feature, for each country, a TFP index, which is TFP relative to the United
States in each period. Of course, then, U.S. TFP is normalized to 1 in all periods. Therefore, we
construct U.S. TFP using a standard Solow residual approach and then use the Penn World Tables
TFP indices to back out implied TFP levels for all other countries in our sample.
10These data are publicly available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/
11These data can be found at https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/ While
these data are publicly available, at the time of writing this paper accessing the data requires creating
an account, which is free of charge.
12Tables 1 and 3 from http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/marginal-tax-rates/
13NBER tax series is available for a bit shorter time horizon.
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countries in our sample.14
Table 1: Notation for Empirical Variables
Notation Meaning
C=Y Consumption-output ratio
1 + C tax Return-adjusted consumption tax, 1   c (McDaniel, 2007)
1  L tax Return-adjusted labor tax, 1   l (McDaniel, 2007)
1 K tax Return-adjusted capital tax, 1  k (McDaniel, 2007)
1 NBER L tax Return-adjusted NBER labor tax
TFP Total factor productivity
d ln (x) Growth rate of variable x
H empirical Hours worked per population
H x h H holding h xed at 1960 level (h1960  et)
H x e H holding e xed at 1960 level (ht  e1960)
h empirical Hours worked per worker
e empirical Employment-population ratio
Some highlights follow. First, Figure 2 shows that over the last several decades
the main driving force behind the behavior of H in the United states is e, with h
being relatively at.15 The exact opposite is true of Europe, but with the behavior
of e being virtually at in absolute terms. Figure 3 shows that in the United States
C=Y rose,  k decreased,  c was fairly at, and  l rose. In Europe, C=Y , decreased,  k
rose,  c rose somewhat as well, and there was a large secular increase in  l. Finally,
Figure 4 shows that that TFP in the United States and Europe has followed a similar
secular increase, with TFP growth slowing in Europe only towards the end of our
sample (in this gure Europes TFP in 1960 is relative to that of the United States,
which is normalized to 100).
14On average the patterns for Europe reect those across the European countries in our sample,
so no single country drives the average. Also, results are robust to the averaging methodology
including, for instance, GDP-weighted averages.
15Rogerson (2006) and Blundell et al. (2011) also broadly highlight these facts.
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Figure 2: Hours worked per population, per worker, and the employment-population ratio in Europe
(bottom panel) and the US (top panel).16
Figure 3: Empirical macroeconomic series for Europe (bottom panel) and the US (top panel).17
16Note: total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database, employment
is from the OECD, and population data are from the UN.
17Notes: data on total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database,
employment is from the OECD, population data are from the UN, tax data from McDaniel (2007),
and output and consumption from the Penn Word Tables.
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Figure 4: Total factor productivity in Europe and the US.18
Table 2 shows results from running a panel regression with all countries in our sam-
ple, where the left-hand side variable is, alternatively, d ln (et), d ln (ht), and d ln (Ht).
The regressands are the contemporaneous growth rates of return-adjusted taxes ( i is
the investment tax). For each left-hand side variable this regression is run with and
without a business cycle control: the growth rate of output per population, d ln (Yt).
Consumption taxes are insignicant, labor taxes have the correct sign (higher  l puts
downward pressure on labor market variables) throughout and are signicant on net,
and investment taxes are not signicant.
Finally, note that capital taxes are contemporaneously positively and signicantly
associated with e and H, but not with h. To the best of our knowledge, this is a new
stylized fact, which implies that the association ofH with capital taxes seeps in via the
association of e with capital taxes. As shown below, our DLM model suggests that this
contemporaneous positive relationship between capital taxes and e and H is not causal.
Instead, our DLM model implies that these relationships should be observed as an
ex-post outcome of forward looking employment demand from previous periods, with,
in line with intuition, expected increases in capital taxes putting downward pressure
on employment demand (we elaborate on this relationship later).
18Notes: data are from the Penn World tables.
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Table 2: Panel Regression of Labor Market Variables19
Variable d ln(et) d ln(et) d ln(ht) d ln(ht) d ln(Ht) d ln(Ht)
d ln(1 +  ct) 0:02  0:33 0:08 0:01 0:10  0:32
(0:61) (0:34) (0:13) (0:08) (0:71) (0:37)
d ln(1   lt) 0:22
 0:16 0:07 0:05 0:29 0:21
(0:09) (0:07) (0:03) (0:03) (0:07) (0:06)
d ln(1  kt )  0:18
  0:14  0:05  0:04  0:23  0:17
(0:07) (0:06) (0:04) (0:03) (0:06) (0:04)
d ln(1 +  it) 0:01 0:59  0:11 0:00  0:10 0:59
(1:09) (0:53) (0:22) (0:11) (1:29) (0:62)
d ln(Yt) 0:29
 0:06 0:35
(0:04) (0:01) (0:04)
Country x. e¤. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 648 648 648 648 648 648
4 Theory
Our DLM model begins as a full-edged general equilibrium labor search model.
Among other benets, this approach allows for a disciplined and well-grounded the-
oretical justication for the presence of household-side search e¤ort and the way in
which we incorporate rm-side employment adjustment costs. However, the baseline
specication of our DLM model is purged of certain elements of standard search the-
ory. Amid this backdrop, in our baseline DLM model all markets are competitive,
including the labor market. The modeling decision to purge our bottom-line DLM
specication of certain search elements is specically guided by the principle of mak-
ing our DLM model easily comparable to the CLM model and, moreover, making our
DLM model a tractable and intuitive extension of the CLM model.
The aggregate population consists of a unit mass, and a household (not social)
planner solves the households optimization problem. In contrast to related litera-
ture, the economys population is entirely selsh, atomistic, and autonomous. Au-
tonomous in this paper means that each (atomistic) household member has the
power to renege on the household planners solution if it is not incentive compatible.
19Notes: total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database, employment
is from the OECD, population data are from the UN, output is from the Penn World Tables, and
tax data are from McDaniel (2007).
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The resources of all economic agents that are in the household are pooled.
We assume that the household owns the economys nal-goods producing rm,
and, without loss of generality, that the rm owns the economys capital stock. House-
holds can purchase corporate bonds and rms can issue debt. Corporate bonds and
debt mature one period after being issued. Therefore, within any period the inow of
new bonds and debt is equivalent to the total stock of bonds and debt. The inclusion
of debt guarantees that rms are able to pay any incurred vacancy-adjustment costs,
which, as we show, ultimately link capital taxes to employment.
Mathematical details regarding all of the following can be found in the Appendix.
Moving forward, all non-price variables are normalized by the aggregate population.
Moreover, all price variables are normalized by the price of consumption.
4.1 The Household
In line with standard labor-search theory from the households point of view employ-
ment evolves as follows:
et = (1  ) et 1 + F (t) ptst. (1)
Above et denotes employment,  is the exogenous job destruction probability, and st is
the endogenous mass of job searchers. F (t) pt is the households e¤ective job nding
probability. pt 2 [0; 1] is exogenous, and t is household-controlled search e¤ort. F
0 
0, F 00  0, F (0) = 0, and Ft ! 1 as t !1.
20 These diminishing returns to search
e¤ort are justied both theoretically and empirically (see, for instance, Pissarides,
2000, and Chirinko, 1984). All told, equation (1) says that period-t employment is
equal to the sum of all individuals who were employed last period whose jobs were
not destroyed, (1   )et 1, and the mass of successful contemporaneous searchers,
F (t) ptst.
21 This equation is a constraint in the households problem.
Also in line with standard labor-search theory we assume that in equilibrium all
individuals participate in the labor market. Therefore, in equilibrium the mass of
contemporary searchers is equal to the sum of all individuals who did not nd a job
20These assumptions guarantee that the e¤ective job nding probability is never greater than 1,
as should be the case.
21We follow the timing convention in Arseneau and Chugh (20120).
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in the previous period, 1   et 1, and the mass of all individuals whose jobs were
destroyed at the end of the previous period, et 1. As such,
st = (1  et 1) + et 1. (2)
Given the timing of the model in each period t there are three employment states.
These states are newly employed workers (those who ow into employment in period
t, F (t) ptst), old employed workers (those whose jobs were not destroyed at the
end of the previous period, (1   )et 1), and searchers who did not nd jobs in this
same period (1   F (t))ptstnonemployed individuals.
The households lifetime utility Ut is equal to the innite sum of the weighted
sum of the instantaneous utility of individuals in each employment state. As such,
Ut  Et
1X
s=t
s t
8>>><
>>>:
eolds
ve;Osz }| {
u(Ce;olds ) G(h
old
s )

+ enews
ve;Nsz }| {
[u(Ce;news ) G(h
new
s ) D (t)]
+ (1  es)
vnsz }| {
[u (Cns ) D (t)]
9>>>=
>>>; ,
where  is the exogenous subjective discount factor, eolds denotes old employed indi-
viduals, enews denotes new employed individuals, and 1   es is the mass of period-s
unsuccessful searchers (nonemployed individuals). ve;olds , v
e;new
s , and v
n
s are, respec-
tively, the instantaneous utilities of each of these individuals, and Ce;olds , C
e;new
s , and
Cns denote the consumption these individuals.
22 We assume that these consumptions
are, respectively, a fraction e;olds , 
e;new
s , and 1   
e;old
s   
e;new
s of aggregate con-
sumption Cs. Also, h
old
s is hours worked per old employed individual and h
new
s is
hours worked per newly employed individual. Finally, u is utility from consumption
(u0 > 0 and u00 < 0), G is disutility from work hours (G0 > 0 and G00 > 0), and D is
disutility from search e¤ort (D0 > 0, D00 > 0, and Dt ! 1 as  ! 1, where these
last two assumptions are consistent with the assumptions on F ).
As noted earlier, the economys population is assumed to be atomistic, autonomous,
and selsh. Therefore the household planner faces a series of incentive compatibility
22The instantaneous utility of individuals in old employment does not include disutility from search
e¤ort since they do not search in the current period. In contrast, both newly employed individuals
and unsuccesful searchers expend contemporaneous search e¤ort, which of course is the same in
equilibrium.
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(participation) constraints. First, ve;oldt  v
e;new
t . Second, v
e;new
t  v
n
t . Third, v
n
t 
vt, where vt denotes the outside option of individuals from reneging on the household
planners decision and leaving the household. Jointly, these constraints guarantee
that individuals will accept the household planners proposed solution and pool their
resources within the household.
The households budget constraint is
(1 +  ct)Ct + (bt   bt 1) 
 
1   lt

wt(h
old
t e
old
t + h
new
t e
new
t )
+UB  st + Vt +
 
1   kt

rt 1bt 1 + Tt. (3)
Above,  ct is the consumption tax, bt denotes period-t bonds, 
l
t is the labor tax,
wt is the real wage, UB denotes unemployment benets, which are paid to every
individual who searches in a period and is unsuccessful in nding a job, Vt denotes
net-of-(capital)-tax dividends paid by the rm to the household (recall that the house-
hold owns the rm),  kt is the capital tax, rt is the period-t real interest rate, and Tt
denotes government transfers. The household takes all taxes, prices, the unemploy-
ment benet, dividends, and transfers as given.
The household planners choice variables are the following. Ct, 
e;old
t , 
e;new
t , 
n
t ,
holdt , h
new
t , et, st, t, and bt. Of course, given that e
old
t = (1  ) et 1, then knowing st
and et is su¢cient to know the distribution of the entire population across employment
states.
In what follows, for brevity, we focus on rst order conditions relevant for the
labor market, only. In addition, we present the households optimality conditions
for the baseline version of our DLM model, which is purged from certain elements of
labor search theory (optimality conditions from the full-edged search model are in
the Appendix). In particular, our purging assumes: pt = 1 in all periods t,  = 1,
and UB = 0. These assumptions are broadly in line with those used in Arseneau and
Chugh (2012) when the authors show how to collapse their general equilibrium labor
search model to a standard real business cycle (RBC) model. Given these assumptions
equation (1) collapses to et = F (t).
As shown in the Appendix, in equilibrium hnewt = h
old
t = ht, which is intuitive.
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As also shown in the Appendix, as a result of the incentive compatibility constraints,
the planners optimal choice of e;oldt and 
e;new
t implies that in equilibrium in each
period t the instantaneous utility of individuals in each employment state is equal-
ized. Therefore, in equilibrium individuals are indi¤erent between being employed or
nonemployed, so there is no involuntary unemployment. This is the case regardless
of the presence of search frictions, and that is why to make this clear we refer to
unsuccessful searchers as nonemployed instead of unemployed.
The remaining relevant optimality conditions are as follows. For aggregate con-
sumption: u0(e;newt Ct)
e;new
t = (1 + 
c
t)t. This is entirely standard in tax-inclusive
frameworks save for the presence of e;newt that nonetheless does not a¤ect the in-
tuition behind this equation: the time-t e¤ective (tax-inclusive) marginal utility of
consumption is equal to the marginal value of real wealth, t. For hours worked per
worker
G0t = t
 
1   lt

wtet, (4)
meaning that the marginal cost of hours worked per worker equals its marginal benet.
Also, combining the optimality conditions for t and et implies that
D0t = t
 
1   lt

wtht  F
0
t . (5)
Given our purging of labor search components, then in our baseline DLM specica-
tion choosing t is the same as choosing et. As such, equation (5) is the households
e¤ective employment supply equation, which means that the marginal cost of em-
ployment (the right-hand side of this equation, which is -dependent) is equal to its
marginal benet (the equations left-hand side, which is also -dependent).
4.2 The Firm
Aggregate output Yt is generated by the production function Yt = Y (Zt; Kt; Ht).
Here, Zt is exogenous total factor productivity and Kt denotes capital. In line with
standard CLM literature we assume that Yt is linear in Zt and increasing and concave
in Kt and Ht. Of course, Ht  ht  et.
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The rms objective function, net-of-(capital)-tax dividends, is given by
Et
1X
s=t
sjt
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
 Vsz }| { 
1   ks
24 Y (Zt; Kt; htet)  wshses   Is
 rs 1ds 1    (Zs)  (vs + 
(vs=vs 1; vsws))
3
5
+(ds   ds 1)
9>>>>>=
>>>>>;| {z }
Vs
. (6)
Above, Is is investment, d denotes debt,  is the exogenous ow cost of posting
vacancies vs. 
 is a standard adjustment cost function that is increasing and convex
in the ratio vs=vs 1 and also increasing vsws. The product vsws captures in a reduced
form way the intuition that hiring costs can reect expenditures on a human resources
department, and therefore are a fraction of the wage bill. 
 is equal to zero whenever
vs equals vs 1, which, in particular, is the case in steady state (the broader relevance
of adjustment costs for labor markets is emphasized by Cooper and Willis, 2004,
Caballero and Engel, 2004, Cooper and Willis, 2008, and Mumtaz and Zanetti, 2014,
among others.)23 Turning to  (Zt), following, for instance, Pissarides (2000), we
assume that the rms costs of posting vacancies are potentially a function of aggregate
productivity. However, we do not make any assumption on whether, if productivity
is indeed related to vacancy posting costs, higher productivity makes it more costly
or less costly for rms to post vacancies. Instead, as discussed below, we arrive at
a conclusion regarding the potential relationship between productivity and vacancy
posting via empirical analysis.
The rm faces two constraints. First, a standard equation of motion for the capital
stock, Kt+1 = It + (1  )Kt, where  is the capital depreciation rate. Second, its
perceived evolution of employment, et = (1  ) et 1 + qtvt, where qt is the job lling
probability, which the rm takes as given. In words, this equation says that the
rms contemporaneous stock of employed individuals is equal to the sum of all of
23Of course, the change in the rms debt position is not taxed, and, intuitively, we assume that
Vt  0 8t. Moreover, we do not include investment taxes since, per the evidence in Table 1 they
do not have an impact on labor market variables and, furthermore, in our DLM model, in line with
CLM models, investment taxes do not have a theoretical impact on labor market variables either.
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the previous periods workers who did not lose their job, (1  ) et 1, and all newly
formed employment relationships, which are equal to the fraction of all vacancies
posted that are lled in a period, qtvt.
The rms choice variables are Kt+1 (i.e., It), dt, ht, et, and vt. For brevity, we
present the rms optimality condition for the baseline version of our DLM model,
which, as noted earlier, is purged from certain elements of labor search theory (opti-
mality conditions from the full-edged search model are in the Appendix). In partic-
ular, as relevant for the rm, these purging assumptions are qt = 1 in all periods t,
 = 1, and  = 0 (these assumptions are broadly in line with Arseneau and Chugh,
2012, when the authors show how to collapse their general equilibrium labor search
model to a standard RBC model). In this environment the rms equation of motion
for employment collapses to et = vt, so the rms choice of vacancies is one and the
same with its choice of employment.
We continue to focus on the labor market. The rst order condition for ht implies
that
Yht = wtet, (7)
which of course means that the marginal product of hours worked per worker is equal
to its marginal cost and, therefore, that the wage is competitive. The rst order
condition for employment, which, recall, given our purging assumptions is one and
the same with the rst order condition for vacancies, is
  (Zt)
@
t
@et
= Ett+1jt
1   kt+1
1   kt
 (Zt+1)
@
t+1
@et
. (8)
This means that whenever the rm is adjusting employment, employment demand is
forward looking, as in standard models of labor demand with adjustment costs (see,
for instance, Sargent, 1979).24 Of note, the derivation of equation (8) uses the fact
that from equation (7) Yh;tht = wthtet, which given the fact that Yhtht equals Yetet
implies, as a result, that Ye;tet = wthtet.
24In periods in which the rm does not adjust employment demand, adjustment costs are zero and
equation (8) implies that employment demand is pinned down by the following optimality condition:
Yet = wtht.
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Equation (8) means that rms nd it optimal to equate the post-tax marginal cost
of changing employment today to the post-tax (discounted) marginal cost of changing
employment tomorrow. Another way to interpret this equation is that rms optimally
decide on employment adjustment in order to smooth adjustment costs over time (and,
more specically, smooth the consumption value of net-of-(capital)-tax dividends for
the household). As an example, suppose that at time t an expected increase in next
periods capital tax rate  kt+1 lowers the ratio
1 kt+1
1 kt
. To restore equation (8) the rm
will raise @
t
@et
, which will require raising expected employment.
4.3 Closing the Model
Throughout the remainder of the paper we henceforth focus exclusively on the baseline
(purged) version of our DLM model. In particular, recall that this purging involves
assuming the following: , pt, and qt are equal to 1 in all periods, and UB and 
are equal to zero in all periods. To close the model we assume that government con-
sumption is zero, so that Tt = 
c
tCt + 
l
twthtet + 
k
t
 
rt 1bt 1 + Vt

. This implies that
the aggregate resource constraint is given by Yt = Ct + It +  (Zt) 
 (et=et 1; etwt)
whenever et is not equal to et 1, and Yt = Ct + It whenever the rm does not adjust
employment. The models equilibrium is discussed in the Appendix.
5 Operationalizing the Theory
Recall once more that as noted earlier throughout the remainder of the paper we focus
exclusively on the purged version of our DLM model.
Following the literature most related to our paper, we evaluate our DLM models
performance by using the business cycle accounting approach.25 For our purposes,
this involves the following. Suppose that a variable Xt is a function of the vector
of variables and parameters 	t such that Xt = X (	t). The models performance
regarding this variable is evaluated by taking the equation Xt = X (	t) and feeding
into it empirical data for 	t, which results in a theory-implied prediction for the
25Key references are, for example, Prescott (2004) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007)
among others.
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behavior of Xt. Assessing the models t then involves comparing this theory-implied
prediction for the behavior of Xt with its empirical behavior.
Of course, our DLM models equilibrium condition for ht (equation (9)) is static,
so it is straightforward to test this condition using business cycle accounting. That
said, because employment demand (equation (8)) is dynamic, then so is equilibrium
employment. Therefore, to be conceptually in line with business cycle accounting,
we will assess the t of our DLM models dynamic equilibrium employment equation
from an ex-post vantage point.
5.1 Functional Forms
In line with related literature we assume a standard constant returns to scale produc-
tion function Yt = ZtK

t (htet)
1  where  2 (0, 1) and therefore Yhtht = (1  )Yt
and Yetet = (1  ) Yt. Turning to employment demand, we assume that  (Zt) =
Zt , where, as discussed earlier,  will be estimated and its value could, in principle,
be less than zero, greater than zero, or equal to zero. We also assume the following
cost function: 
t =  It (et=et 1)
 etwt, where  > 0,  > 1, and It equals zero if et
equals et 1 and


1+
t 1
otherwise. As such, It guarantees that adjustment costs are
zero whenever the rm is not adjusting vacancies (which, in particular, is the case
in steady state), the fact that when adjusting employment It equals


1+
t 1
is a
technical assumption that guarantees that the growth rate of employment is zero in
steady state.
Turning to the household, following the assumptions in Shimer (2009) as applicable
to the present context we assumeG (ht) = 
"
1+"
(ht)
1+"
" , where:  and " are parameters
that are strictly greater than zero. As such, in our DLMmodel " is the Frisch elasticity
of the supply of hours worked per worker. Also following Shimer (2009), let u () =
ln (). For expositional tractability we assume F (t) = '

t , where  2 (0; 1) and
' > 0 (parameters are assumed to be in line with only innite search e¤ort being
su¢cient to approach a value of Ft equal to 1, even though our assumed functional
form for F does not asymptote at 1), and also Dt = %

t , where  > 1 and % > 0.
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5.2 DLM Testable Implications
5.2.1 Hours Worked per Worker
As shown in the Appendix, combining the demand and supply of hours worked per
worker implies the following equilibrium condition, which is one of two testable im-
plications that our DLM model yields about the labor market:26
ht =

(1  )   1
 
1   lt

 (1 +  ct)
 1Ct=Yt
 "
1+" . (9)
Above, " is the elasticity of hours worked per worker with respect to the wage.
Intuitively, increases in labor taxes chip away at the value of the extra hour of work,
increases in consumption taxes raise the price of consumption, and therefore increase
the opportunity cost of consumption in terms of leisure, and a higher consumption-
output ratio reduces the marginal value (in terms of consumption) of an additional
hour of work.
To generate our DLM models predictions of hours worked per worker, we proceed
as follows. First, we run a panel of the regression corresponding to equation (9) after
taking logarithms. Coe¢cients are constrained as implied by the theory, and we arrive
at a single cross-country estimate of "
1+"
, so for our purposes the preference parameter
" is the same across countries. Then, for each country in our sample, we feed country-
specic empirical time series data on consumption, consumption taxes, output, and
labor taxes, into the right-hand side of equation (9) that, given our estimate of "
1+"
,
yield our DLMmodels country-specic predictions for hours worked per worker. Since
our interest is in long run trends, in line with related literature, such as Shimer (2009),
the value of 1 

is chosen so that the average of predicted hours worked per worker
match the average of their empirical counterpart on a country-by-country basis.
5.2.2 Employment
Turning to employment, with our assume functional forms and taking logs equation
26Given our functional form assumptions rst order condition for aggregate consumption is
C 1t = (1 + 
c
t)t.
Therefore, the optimal values of the  variables are irrelevant for our analysis.
(8) yields the following forward looking condition for employment demand:27
d ln et =
1 + 

d ln et+1 +
1

2
4 d lnwt+1 + d lnZt+1
 d lnt+1 + d ln
 
1   kt+1

3
5 (10)
(see the Appendix for details). Therefore, from the vantage point of the rms period-t
decision making equation (10) conveys the following optimal rm-side actions. Higher
d lnwt+1, higher d ln et+1, and lower d lnt+1 are associated with higher future output,
given which the rm anticipates an expansion in future employment. In order to
smooth adjustment costs, the rm frontloads some of this employment expansion,
which puts upward pressure on d ln et. For concreteness assume that  < 0. As
such, higher d lnZt+1 means lower adjustment costs in the future. In smoothing these
costs the rm postpones some contemporaneous adjustment, which puts downward
pressure on d ln et. Finally, higher capital taxes mean that future net-of-capital-tax
dividends will be lower, given which the rm wants to adjust the least possible amount
today in order to get as much net-of-tax-dividends today and, therefore, before the
increase in capital taxes. This puts downward pressure on d ln et.
It follows that the right-hand side of equation (10) reects causal factors a¤ecting
the rms contemporaneous demand. However, solving this equation for d ln et+1
and lagging the equation one period gives us an ex-post perspective that, therefore,
reects outcomes (and not contemporaneous causality) that should be observed given
the rms decisions in the earlier period:
d ln et+1 =

1 + 
d ln et  
1
1 + 
2
4 d lnwt+1 + d lnZt+1
 d lnt+1 + d ln
 
1   kt+1

3
5 . (11)
Combining the dynamic equation for employment demand with a dynamic ver-
sion of employment supply (see the Appendix for details) yields our DLM models
second testable implication, which is the following dynamic equation for equilibrium
27As noted earlier, we will focus on from an ex-post perspective later in order to make business
cycle accounting feasible, which is why here for simplicity we drop expectation operators.
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employment:28
d ln et =

+
 


 1d ln et 1
+
1
+
 


 1
2
4  1 + "1+" d ln  1   lt  "1+"d ln (1 +  ct)
  "
1+"
d ln (Ct=Yt)  d ln
 
1   kt

  d lnZt
3
5 . (12)
Intuitively, this is an autoregressive moving average process with exogenous variables
(ARMAX) for equilibrium employmentclearly, this equilibrium process is nonex-
plosive in employment. In this equation the variables scaled by coe¢cients that
include " trace back to the supply of hours worked per worker, of which employment
supply is a function of. The terms that involve ", which are
 
1 + "
1+"

d ln
 
1   lt

,
"
1+"
d ln (1 +  ct), and
"
1+"
d ln (Ct=Yt), also trace back to the supply of hours worked
per worker, and their impact on equilibrium employment is akin to their impact on
equilibrium h. In addition, the presence of = traces back to employment supply
and reects the relative degree of diminishing returns to search.29
To operationalize equation (12) via business cycle accounting we rst estimate
its parameters. To be internally consistent, the regressors
 
1 + "
1+"

d ln
 
1   lt

,
"
1+"
d ln (1 +  ct), and
"
1+"
d ln (Ct=Yt) are generated using the estimate of " obtained
from from running the regression corresponding to equation (9). As such, our (con-
strained, as implied by the theory) regression of equation (12) yields estimates of

+ 

, 1
+ 

, and 
+ 

.
Recall that in estimating equation (9) we run a panel with all countries in our
sample since with that equation we are ultimately estimating ", which is a preference
parameter and therefore should not be assumed to be di¤erent across countries. How-
ever, in estimating equation (12) we are guided by the fact that there are well-known
28Moreover, the households stochastic discount factor is
sjt  
s tCt  C
 1
s (1 + 
c
t) (1 + 
c
s) ,
where s  t, which means that higher consumption as well as higher consumption taxes (or, taken
together, higher consumption expenditures) at time t lower the marginal value of consumption in
that period.
29It is straightforward to show that in steady state equilibrium employment is tax-wise only a
function of labor taxes (decreasing) and consumption taxes (decreasing).
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di¤erences between the relative exibility of European versus U.S. labor markets
(see, for instance, Llosa et al., 2014). For example, consider the OECDs indicators
of employment protection legislation (indices that go from 0, which implies least em-
ployment restrictions, to 6, which implies most employment restrictions)30. In our
European sample, the average index for: protection of permanent workers against
individual and collective dismissal is 2.47; the average protection of permanent work-
ers against individual dismissal is 2.16; specic requirements for collective dismissal
is 3.24; and regulation on temporary forms of employment is 1.91. In contrast, in
the United States these gures are, respectively: 1.17 (over 50 percent lower than in
Europe); 0.49 (nearly 80 percent lower than in Europe); 2.88 (over 10 percent lower
than in Europe); and 0.33 (over 80 percent lower than in Europe).
Importantly, note that in equation (12) all parameters to be estimated can be
interpreted as reecting, in a reduced form way, economic factors related to labor
market rigidities. Indeed, a relatively higher value of  means that it is more costly
for rms to adjust employment, a relatively higher value of = means that relative
returns to search decrease at a faster rate, and, assuming for concreteness that  is
negative, a lower  means that higher productivity lessens employment adjustment
costs by a relatively lower amount. In line with the evidence on labor market rigidities,
it follows that there is no reason to expect that these parameters would be the same
in Europe as in the United States. Thus, in estimating equation (12) we run a panel
for Europe and a separate regression for the United States.
Given the estimated parameter values from running the regressions to estimate
equation (12), we generate our DLM model-predicted level employment series for
each country in our sample as follows. Let xi denote empirical values for country
is variable x, xi denote predicted values for country i of variable x, and ^ denote
the applicable vector of parameter estimates from running the regressions to estimate
equation (12). First, we generate our DLM model-predicted employment growth rate
for country i between the rst growth rate that we can predict conditional on our
30https://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
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datas starting point (period t 1 for the purposes of what follows immediately below
before ending this section) using the following equation:
d ln (ei;t) = ^
0

2
4 d ln (ei;t 1) ; d ln  1   li;t ; d ln  1 +  ci;t ;
d ln (Ci;t=Y ) ; d ln
 
1   ki;t

; d ln (Zi;t)
3
5 .
Thereafter, we predict growth rates using for our lagged growth rates the models
predicted growth rates. In other words, the models prediction of d ln (ei;t+1) uses
d ln (ei;t). Therefore, except for the rst lagged growth rate used, all other lagged growth
rates used to get our model-generated predictions are fully and entirely endogenous.
Second, with our model-generated growth rates in hand, we then use the rst
empirical level of employment in period t along with the model-predicted growth
rate between period t and period t + 1 to arrive at the models rst predicted level
value of employment. We generate the remaining level values of employment by using
the previous periods predicted employment levels. Akin to our DLM models hours
worked per worker predictions, the (level) employment series predicted by our DLM
model is rescaled to have the same mean as the empirical employment series on a
country-by-country basis.31
5.3 CLM Model H
We operationalize a representative version of the CLM model, in particular, the one
used in Shimer (2009), in order to compare results from this model regarding H to
the results from our DLM model. This version of the CLM model yields tax-inclusive
results that are representative of related literature: a successful prediction of hours
worked per population in Europe and highly counterfactual results for the United
States.
In the CLM model the production function is the same as in our DLM model, and
the households instantaneous utility is ln (Ct)   " (1 + ")
 1 (Ht)
"
1+" , so in this case
" is the Frisch elasticity of the supply of hours worked per population (in contrast to
31We obtain our DLM models predicted equilibrium employment series using its dynamic version
since in our data no two adjacent employment gures are the same. In other words, in taking our
model to the data the implication is that employment adjustment costs were paid in every period.
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the DLM model, where " is the Frisch elasticity of the supply of hours worked per
worker). Of course, all taxes we consider in our DLM model remain the same in the
CLM model, and in the CLM model the households budget constraint is the same
as in our DLM model.
All told, as shown in the Appendix, the following is the single equilibrium labor
market condition that arises in the CLM model:
Ht =

(1  )   1
 
1   lt

 (1 +  ct)
 1Ct=Yt
 "
1+" . (13)
(recall that the CLM model does not distinguish between the di¤erent margins of
labor). Importantly, note that the right-hand side of equations (9) and (13) are
the same (therefore, the intuition behind equation (13) is entirely analogous to the
intuition behind equation (9)). Of note, this means that per our DLM model the
CLM models equation for equilibrium H is, in fact, an equation for equilibrium h.
In abstract terms it is straightforward to show that our DLM models equilibrium
condition for hours worked per worker is
ht = G
 1
 
t
 
1   lt

Yh;tht

and the CLM models equilibrium condition for hours worked per population is
Ht = G
 1
 
t
 
1   lt

YH;tHt

.
With perfect substitutability of e and h in production, then Yh;tht = YH;tHt in the
equations above. Therefore, the fact that our DLM models equation for equilibrium
h is the same as that of the CLM model for equilibrium H is not functional form
dependent.
To operationalize equation (13) we take logarithms as in the case of the hours
per worker equation from our DLM model and run a constrained panel regression to
estimate the CLM models value of ". Then, we generate the CLM model-generated
predicted Ht using the same methodology used to generate DLM-model predicted h
as discussed earlier. Results from this operationalization are those shown in Figure 1
in the papers introduction.
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6 Results
Recall that H is the only endogenous labor market variable predicted by the CLM
model, and that the H predicted by our DLM model is built from the bottom up by
rst predicting h and e separately. Per the operationalization description in Section
5, our results obtain from predicting the CLM models Hi;t for each country i in our
sample, and predicting our DLM models hi;t and ei;t for each country in our sample
and then constructing Hi;t by multiplying these two. Model-generated results for
Europe are the simple average across the model-predicted Hi;t of european countries
in our sample.
In what follows, we rst show results from the regressions detailed earlier and
highlight the implications of parameter estimates (Section 6.1). Then, we summarize
model performance from a quantitative perspective across countries and on an indi-
vidual basis (Section 6.2). In addition, we address model performance from the trend
and contour perspective (Section 6.3). Finally, we focus on the implications of our
model for the long-run labor wedge (Section 6.4).
6.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 3 shows results from running, in the fashion discussed earlier, constrained panel
of the regressions corresponding to equations (9) and (13) in rows 1 and 2, respectively.
All parameter estimates are statistically signicant and of the correct sign. For our
DLM models h the implied estimate of " is 1.44 (in this case the Frisch elasticity
of the supply of hours worked per worker), and for the CLM models H the implied
estimate of " is 2.84 (in this case the Frisch elasticity of hours worked per population).
Table 3: Estimates of Labor Elasticities32
Variable ln(Ct=Yt) ln(1 + 
c
t) ln(1  
l
t) Country x. e¤. Obs.
ln(ht) -0.59
 -0.59 0.59 yes 660
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Ht) -0.74
 -0.74 -0.74 yes 660
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
32Notes: total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database, employment
is from the OECD, and population data are from the UN. Construction of model results use tax
data from McDaniel (2007), and consumption and output data are from the Penn Word Tables.
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Table 4 shows results from running the constrained regression of equation (12) in
panel form for Europe (rst row) and individually for the United States (second row).
All parameter estimates are statistically signicant. Moreover, the implied value of
 + = is 11.11 in Europe and 4.16 in the United States. Give these values: (1.)
the implied value  is 5.56 in Europe and 1.78 in the United States, which means
that the elasticity of employment adjustment costs with respect to the relative size
of adjustment is over twice as high in Europe compared to the United States; and
(2.) the implied value of = in Europe is 5.55 and 2.38 in the United States, which
means that search returns decrease at a rate over twice as high in Europe compared
to the United States. Finally, the implied value of  is  0:44 in Europe and  0:79 in
the United States. Since  is negative, this means that when productivity is higher,
employment adjustment costs are lowerintuitively, this can capture in a reduced
form way that higher productivity can o¤set expansionary structural changes in the
rm that must take place in order to accommodate more workers. Moreover, the fact
that the value of  in the United States is less than its value in Europe implies that
higher productivity decreases employment adjustment costs by less in Europe than
the United States.
All told, we speculated that parameters in our DLM models dynamic expres-
sion for equilibrium employment reect underlying structural factors related to labor
market rigidities. Results shown in Table 4 are indeed in line with this. Indeed, the
implied rigidities from our results are consistent with these rigidities being substan-
tially greater in Europe compared to the United States, which is in line with empirical
evidence that studies these rigidities explicitly. Taken together, these results lend sub-
stantial validity to our DLM model.
Table 4: Estimates of Employment Equation d ln (et) regressand
33
d ln of variable:
Region et 1 TFPt
Ct
Yt
1 +  ct d ln 1  
k
t d ln 1 + 
l
t Country x. e¤. Obs.
Europe 0.50 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 0.09 yes 583
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
US 0.43 0.19 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 0.24  53
(0.19) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
33Notes: total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database, employment
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6.2 Cross-Country Quantitative Performance
A key issue related to our research is understanding the extent to which our DLM
model does relatively better or worse at predicting hours worked per population across
countries compared to the CLM model. To get at this assessment, dene for each
country i in our sample the sum of squared deviations measure
SSDi 
X
t
 
d lnHDLMi;t   d lnHi;t
2

"X
t
 
d lnHCLMi;t   d lnHi;t
2# 1
and the sum of absolute deviations measure
SADi 
X
t
d lnHDLMi;t   d lnHi;t 
"X
t
 
d lnHCLMi;t   d lnHi;t
# 1
,
where d lnHi;t is the growth rate of empirical H and d lnH
j
i;t is model-predicted H by
model j 2 fCLM; DLMg. Then, for country i consider the numbers 100 (1 SSDi)
 ]SSDi and 100  (1   SADi)  ]SADi. This means that for zi 2 f]SSDi; ]SADig
numbers zi > 0 denote that our DLM does zi percent better than the CLM model at
predicting the growth rate of H, while numbers zi < 0 denote that our DLM does zi
percent worse than the CLM model at predicting the growth rate of H. Of course,
zi = 0 implies that both models do equally well.
Table 5 shows ]SSDi and ]SADi for all countries in our sample. On the basis of
these metrics, we conclude that, compared to the CLM framework, our DLM model
is an important step forward in understanding and predicting the behavior of hours
worked per population. Results imply that on average our DLM model does better
than the CLM model by between 12 and 20 percent, with notable improvements of
up to 43 percent for the United Kingdom and 31 percent for the United States. The
is from the OECD, and population data are from the UN. Construction of model results use tax
data from McDaniel (2007), and output, consumption and productivity data from the Penn Word
Tables.
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only country for which model performance is about the same is France.
Table 5: Comparison of CLM and DLM model performance34
(in %) Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Italy
]SSDi 16:26 32:64 23:64 0:63 25:26 11:91
]SADi 4:21 26:5 7:89  2:43 11:50 9:03
(in %) Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland UK US
]SSDi 18:24 11:43 10:72 12:64 43:11 31:49
]SADi 10:62 7:83 8:19 7:69 28:15 22:7
6.3 Trend and Contour Analysis
Table 6 shows notation used for the purposes of presenting results in what follows. For
our DLM model, Figure 5 shows results for h. Figure 6 shows results for e. Finally,
Figure 7 shows results for H from both our DLM model and the CLM model.
Table 6: Notation for DLM Model Generated Variables
Notation Meaning
h (e) DLM Prediction per equation 9 (12)
H DLM Product of h DLM and e DLM
h (e) DLM C=Y fix Prediction per equation 9 (12)
holding C=Y xed
h (e) DLM cons tax fix Prediction per equation 9 (12)
holding  ct xed
h (e) DLM lab tax fix Prediction per equation 9 (12)
holding  lt xed
e DLM cap tax fix Prediction per equation 9
holding kt xed
e DLM TFP fix Prediction per equation 9
holding TFP xed
Figure 5 shows that our DLM model tracks the behavior of h in both Europe and
the United States very well. The same is true for e as shown in Figure 6. In each of
these gures, counterfactuals (x) holding one at a time constant the ingredients
that go into predictions of each variable reveal the most important driving forces
associated with the behavior of each variable. Per Figure 5, in the United States,
increases in C=Y and  l (recall Figure 3) have put downward pressure on h. In
Europe the most important variable associated with the behavior of h is  l, with
results implying that absent the substantial secular increase in  l (recall Figure 3) h
34Notes: total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database, employment
is from the OECD, and population data are from the UN. Construction of model results use tax
data from McDaniel (2007), and output, consumption and productivity data from the Penn Word
Tables.
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would have been at.
Figure 5: Empirical hours worked per population and DLM model predictions for Europe (bottom
panel) and the US (top panel).35
Per Figure 6, in the United States, gains in TFP (recall Figure 4) are the most
important factor associated with gains in employment, absent which e would have
been at. Taxes and C=Y play a secondary role, and mostly matter for the contour
of e. That said, increases in C=Y and  l, and decreases in  k (recall Figure 3)
jointly put downward pressure on e. (Recall that per our DLM models equation
for equilibrium employment, the contemporaneous relationship between capital taxes
and employment is not causal, but instead an observed outcome of forward-looking
employment demand from earlier periods given which, and in line with intuition,
capital taxes put downward pressure on employment demand.) For Europe, the
message regarding e from Figure 6 is quite stark: at e is associated with the secular
increase in  l o¤setting gains in TFP that would have otherwise been associated with
gains in e.
35Notes: total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database, employment
is from the OECD, and population data are from the UN. Construction of model results use tax
data from McDaniel (2007), and output and consumption data from the Penn Word Tables.
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Figure 6: Empirical employment-population ratio and DLM model predictions for Europe (bottom
panel) and the US (top panel).36
Bringing the two margins of labor together, Figure 7 shows our DLM models
predictions for hours worked per population. Also shown are empirical H and, for
reference, the CLM models predictions as well (already shown in Figure 1). For
Europe, both models perform successfully and fairly similarly. For the United States
our DLM model matches the shallow V-shape of empirical H, while as discussed
36Notes: employment is from the OECD, and population data are from the United Nations.
Construction of model results use tax data from McDaniel (2007), and output, consumption and
productivity data from the Penn Word Tables.
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earlier the CLM model predicts a counterfactual secular decrease in H.
Figure 7 Empirical hours worked per population and DLM and CLM model predictions for Europe
(bottom panel) and the US (top panel).37
As highlighted earlier in the data section, the labor-tax series from McDaniel
(2007), which are average taxes, do not reect, contour wise, the Reagan tax reforms
(1981 through 1986), which in contrast the NBER labor-tax series, which are average
marginal taxes, indeed do reect. Recall as well that both series have broadly the
same trend, and that amid the Reagan tax reforms the McDaniel series imply rising
labor taxeswhich of course is driven by an increase in the tax basewhile the
NBER series imply decreasing taxes, as should be the case.
To assess the impact of these di¤erences, Figure 8 shows results for e and H for
the United States from operationalizing our DLM model with the NBER taxes, as
well as results from the CLM model for H. Regarding e, comparing Figures 6 and
8 shows that our DLM model gets much better at the hump in employment starting
in the early 1980s. This makes sense amid decreasing labor taxes as implied by the
NBER tax series. Comparing Figures 7 and 8, the same is true for H. The endpoints
of e and H predictions are much tighter as well. In addition, the CLM models
37Notes: total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database, employment
is from the OECD, and population data are from the United Nations. Construction of model results
use tax data from McDaniel (2007), and output, consumption and productivity data from the Penn
Word Tables.
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predictions continue to yield counterfactual decreasing H.
In the Appendix we elaborate in further detail on the results described immedi-
ately above regarding the NBER taxes. We also show that an extension of our DLM
model that accounted for di¤erences in trends in employment by gender would for all
purposes close the small remaining employment-hump gap between model and data
that remains in the 1990s.
Figure 8: Results for the United States using NBER labor taxes instead of McDaniel (2007) labor
taxes.38
6.4 Labor Wedge
Our DLM model implies that the CLM models equation for H is in fact an equation
for h. In turn, this implies that per our DLM model, after taxes are accounted
for, an important fraction of the remaining labor wedge associated with the CLM
model should be employment itself. To test this hypothesis, Figure 9 plots empirical
H normalized to 1960, and Hybrid CLM H normalized to 1960 as well. These
hybrid hours are the product of the tax-inclusive CLM models predictions of H and
empirical e. If the CLM models H predictions are in fact predictions of h, then this
38Notes: total work hours are from the Conference Boards Total Economy Database, employment
is from the OECD, and population data are from the United Nations. Construction of model results
use labor-tax data from the NBER, and output, consumption and productivity data from the Penn
Word Tables.
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product should track empirical H very well. As shown in Figure 9, this is indeed
the case. This result lends further validity to our DLM model and, in particular, the
implication that the CLM models equation for H is in fact an equation for h and
that after taxes are accounted for, in the CLM model a large fraction of the remaining
labor wedge is employment itself.
Figure 9: Evidence regarding employment as the labor wedge.39
Putting things in broader context, our results regarding the labor wedge imply
that when hours worked per population are driven by hours worked per worker, as
in the case of Europe (recall Figure 2), the CLM model can give the impression, and
impression only, of correctly predicting hours worked per population, since the CLM
model is in fact predicting hours worked per worker. In contrast, when empirical
hours worked per population are driven by employment, as in the case of the United
States (recall Figure 2) then the CLM model gives the impression, and impression
only, of failing.
7 Conclusions
Hours worked per population (H) are fundamentally important for aggregate eco-
nomic activity. The contemporary canonical macroeconomic modelwhich only
39Notes: employment is from the OECD, and population data are from the United Nations.
Construction of model results use tax data from McDaniel (2007), and output and consumption
data from the Penn Word Tables.
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yields predictions for Hgets at the basic behavior of this variable at business cycle
frequency, but fails dramatically at the trend level. Importantly, a common, widely
accepted, and tractable benchmark model that can get at the basic forces associated
with the trend behavior of H, and, critically, that can explain to a considerable de-
gree the trend behavior of H, remains elusive. Amid this backdrop, identifying the
fundamental forces that matter for the response of H to a host of timely and crit-
ical trend-level developments is problematic. These developments include, but are
not limited to, a slowdown in world output growth, changes in demographics that
are currently critical for advanced economies, and policy issues such as labor-market
reforms, pension reforms, and tax reforms.
In light of these facts, this paper develops and proposes a framework that can serve
as a common reference for modeling the trend behavior of H: the DLM model. Our
DLMmodel, which lies within the representative-agent Walrasian paradigm, is a novel
but intuitive and tractable extension of the canonical model. In particular, our DLM
model decomposes the trend-level determination of H into the two margins of labor
hours worked per worker (h) and the employment-population ratio (e). Unlike earlier
trend-level related literature centered on Walrasian representative agent contexts,
our model does so via household-side employment attainment costs and rm-side
employment adjustment costs.
Our DLM model identies trends in the consumption-output ratio and taxes as
important forces associated with the behavior of h. Our DLM model also explicitly
identies trends in total factor productivity as critically important for the trend be-
havior of e, which is something that by construction earlier related literature cannot
get at, with taxes playing a second-order role for the United Statesmattering mostly
for the contour of ebut playing a more important role for Europe. Moreover, our
DLM model can capture and explain a new stylized fact that we document, which is a
cross-country relationship between capital taxes and e and H, but not with h. These
relationships have not been highlighted by earlier related literature. On net, though,
regarding taxes our model lends further validity to a literature that proposes taxes as
38
an important factor that can help narrow the long-run labor wedge, even though an
endemic feature of this literature is stark counterfactual results for the United States.
Our DLM model can track the behavior of h, e, and H very well in both the United
States and a host of OECD countries. As such, our results suggest that our DLM
model could indeed serve its intended purpose of being a framework that can serve as
a common reference for modeling the trend behavior of H. This implies a broad and
fruitful avenue for future research. In particular, in ongoing research we make use of
our DLM model to explore the role of gender and age for the trend behavior of H.
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